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REVIEW ESSAY
An Introduction to Conventionalism
An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning. By Steven J. Burton.*
Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1985. Pp. xviii, 241. $9.95.
DENNIS

M.

PATTERSON**

If for no other reason than the demands that the undertaking
places on one's powers of clarity, brevity, and succinct statement, the
writing of an introductory textbook on legal reasoning is a project that
most would come to with some reservation, if not trepidation. An
other, no less formidable problem, is to write a book that will' accom
plish the tasks just mentioned without compromising broader interest
in the text on the part of those using it as a pedagogical tool.
Steven Burton has written a book that succeeds admirably at
meeting the difficulties posed by an introductory text. I From a peda
gogical perspective, the book thoroughly and analytically surveys the
principal forms of legal reasoning (analogy and deduction) in the con
text of what Burton describes as "the problem of importance."2 Turn
ing from pedagogy to theory, the unique feature of the book is the
presentation of a theory of interpretation in law that Burton identifies
as "conventionalist."3 It is Burton's advancement of a theory of inter
• Professor of Law, University of Iowa, College of Law.
•• Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College, School of Law.
B.A., 1976; M.A., 1978; J.D., 1980; Ph.D., 1980, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. These difficulties can, indeed, be burdensome. See Morawetz, Addressing Sacred
Texts: On Jurisprudence by Soper and Lyons (Book Review), 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 489, 499
(1985) (reviewing D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LA w (l984) ("Lyons' abbreviated
accounts of the ideas of others are often more misleading than the demands of compression
would require."».
2. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
3. Burton refers to his theory in several places as "conventionalist." A representa
tive example is as follows: "The approach in this book emphasizes the judge's responsibil
ity to the legal community'S conventions of language, argument, and judgment, which seek
to work out the implications of order and justice in cases." S. BURTON, AN INTRODUC
TION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 142 n.20 (l985). For an extended discussion of the
philosophical sources for Burton's view of conventionalism, see infra note 36.
43

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

44

[Vol. 10:43

pretation, coupled with an exegesis of the basics of legal method, that
mark this book as a unique contribution to jurisprudential literature.
This review essay concentrates on two of the book's key, interre
lated themes: methods of legal reasoning and legal interpretation.
. The former topic is a necessary prelude to the latter, because while
Burton sees the traditional forms of legal reasoning as important, in
his view a full account of reason in law must contain a theory of how
judges decide novel issues against the background of conventional
legal practices. This is the theory of interpretation. The book is di
vided into three sections, with the latter two containing the theory of
interpretation that builds upon the description of traditional forms of
legal reasoning found in the first part of the book. Taken together,
they constitute a vigorous introduction to some of the most pressing
issues in contemporary jurisprudence.
I.

THE ELEMENTS OF LAW AND LEGAL ARGUMENT

In Part I of An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning, Burton
describes legal reasoning as "an intellectual process"4 in which legal
problems are addressed and solved, principally by the use of two forms
of reasoning: analogy and deduction. As he emphasizes, before the
forms of legal argument can be considered, more basic considerations
need to be addressed. That is, before one can focus on the for~s of
legal reasoning, one must first identify the material that is constitutive
of legal reasoning itself.
It is to state a truism to say that cases are the "stuff" of legal
argument. But what is a case? How does one identify it, and what is
its relation to legal argument? Burton suggests that a case is best re
garded as a short story, having as it does a beginning, a middle, and an
end. 5 The first phase of the story usually begins in the form of a dis
pute between two or more persons or as a dispute between a citizen
and an authority. The move to the middle phase occurs when one of
the parties files a lawsuit against the other, and ends when the case is
decided by a trial court in favor of one of the parties. As it happens,
the story may not end there, for one of the parties, dissatisfied with the
trial court's decision, may appeal the case to a higher court. When the
case is finally decided, it is usually said that it establishes a rule or is an
instance or application of a rule.
A rule, which is "an abstract or general statement of what the law
4.
5.

S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 9.
Id. at 11.
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permits or requires of classes of persons in classes of circumstances,"6
is by its nature quite general in scope. 7 In other words, a rule ranges
across a variety of circumstances and may encompass a wide range of
cases. Each judicial decision presents an occasion for deciding
whether the case before the court falls within the purview of a legal
rule articulated in a previous decision. It is in answering this central
question, 8 that the forms of legal reasoning are employed.
A.

Analogical Reasoning

Reasoning by analogy is a form of reasoning that is not peculiar
to legal argument. 9 When, in everyday life, any two circumstances are
compared with one another, the motivation for the comparison is to
demonstrate that some material element lO in the one is or is not pres
ent in the other: there is a difference between the two that makes a
difference, and it is that difference that is articulated as a reason for
disparity in treatment. The same is true in legal argument. When a
new case is similar factually to one or more decided cases, that similar
ity in fact figures as a reason in an argument for similarity in legal
disposition. I I
Burton demonstrates the analogical development of common law
rules by employing an example taken from Lon Fuller. 12 In Case 1,
Abbott steals a horse from Costello and sells it to Holliday, who buys
it without notice of the theft. When Costello sues Holliday for its re
6. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 13. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-50
(1961); see also W. TWINING AND D. MIERS, How TO Do THINGS WITH RULES 48-72
(1976).
7. This generality, however, is no guarantee of equality, nor is equality necessarily
associated with generality. See Raz, The Rule ofLaw and Its Virtue, in LIBERTY AND THE
RULE OF LAW 9 (R. Cunningham ed. 1979).
8. Even sophisticated critics of liberal legalism see this as a central concern of any
legalist jurisprudence. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 89 (1975) ("The main
task of the theory of adjudication is to say when a decision can truly be said to stand 'under
a rule,' if the rule we have in mind is the law of the state, applied by a judge. Only deci
sions 'under a rule' are consistent with freedom; others constitute arbitrary exercises of
judicial power. ").
9. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 666-67
(P. Nidditch ed. 1975) ("Reasoning from Analogy leads us often into the discovery of
Truths, and useful Productions, which would otherwise lie concealed."); N. WOLTER
STORFF, WORKS AND WORLDS OF ART 58-105 (1980) (analyzing the role of predicates in
identifying works of art). See generally J.F. Ross, PORTRAYING ANALOGY (1981).
10. Burton does not endorse a philosophical realist's ontology. On the matter of on
tology, he is strictly anti-realist. For a recent attempt to develop an anti-realist semantics,
see C. WRIGHT, REALISM, MEANING & TRUTH 241-363 (1987).
11. See J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 203 (1979).
12. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 32-35 (citing Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdju
dication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 375-76 (1978».
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turn, the court grants relief to Costello, citing the rule that a thief
cannot create an ownership interest in his transferee where the thief
did not have title to the transferred property. A variation on these
facts is presented in Case 2, where Abbott "purchases" the horse from
Costello with a forged check drawn on another's account. When Cos
tello discovers the fraud, he sues for return of the horse and is awarded
a judgment. Here, the applicable rule is different: one who acquires
property by fraud cannot acquire an ownership interest in it.
What happens when, in Case 3, Abbott obtains the horse with a
forged check, but sells it to Holliday before Costello can replevy it
from Abbott? May Costello get the horse back from Holliday, the
innocent purchaser? If the court applies the rules from Cases 1 and 2,
it seems that judgment must be entered for Costello. Because Cos
tello's ownership interest never has been extinguished, the thief has no
legal interest and, thus, cannot pass legal title to the property. But the
court may, and perhaps should, take notice of the important fact that
Holliday took no part in the fraud perpetrated upon Costello. The
court could fashion a new rule such that an owner of property who
loses possession of the property by another's wrongful act may recover
possession only from the perpetrator or from a subsequent purchaser if
the wrongful act was theft. As Burton argues, this new rule remains
faithful to the holdings in Cases 1 and 2 and, in addition, takes ac
count of the material difference in Case 3 that Holliday's possession of
the horse was acquired rightfully.13
B.

Deductive Reasoning

As with analogical reasoning, deductive (syllogistic) reasoning
has its roots in everyday contexts. For example, in the board game
Monopoly, there is a rule that a player passing "Go" receives $200.00
unless that player is going to "Jail," in which case the player gets
nothing. 14 Likewise, if a teacher has a rule that students achieving a
score of 90 or above on an exam will receive a grade of "A," then
Susan must be given an "A" when she scores 92 on the exam. IS
The syllogistic form of reasoning is such that if the premises of
the syllogism are true, it is logically necessary that the conclusion be
true. Despite its apparent simplicity, the syllogism is subject to abuse.
Consider the following:
MAJOR PREMISE: A foot has 39 inches.
13.
14.
15.

S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 38.
Id. at 42.
Id.
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MINOR PREMISE: Susan has a foot.
CONCLUSION:
Susan has 39 inches. 16
Although the form of the argument mimics perfectly the form of
the syllogism, the conclusion is nonsensical. The conclusion is un
sound because the meaning of foot is not consistent between the argu
ment's major and minor premises. 17 A syllogism "is only as good as
its premises and the relationship between them."18 Thus, in the deduc
tive form of argument, "[t]he key problems are (1) adopting a correct
major premise; (2) formulating a correct minor premise in the lan
guage of the major premise; and (3) using the relationship of the prem
ises to yield a sound conclusion."19
As several recent authors on the subject of deductive reasoning in
law have shown, it is the language of the minor premise that poses the
most significant problems for the deductive form of argument. 20 Bur
ton addresses this problem in the context of the "merchant's excep
tion" to the Statute of Frauds in Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 21 When Franny Farmer, a seller of peaches, de
cided that the time for marketing her crop was drawing near, she con
tacted a distributor, Morris Auster. After inspecting the crop, Auster
agreed to buy Farmer's peaches for the price of $40.25 per box. They
shook hands but did not reduce their agreement to writing. 22
Shortly after arriving at their agreement, a severe rain storm
struck the jurisdiction and much of the area's peach crop was de
stroyed. Auster, concerned about his contract with Farmer, sent her a
letter confirming their agreement. Farmer did not reply to the letter
and a month later sold her crop to another vendor for $60.75 per
box. 23
Burton devotes a fair amount of space to the analysis of this hy
pothetical, considering carefully the many arguments that each of the
parties could bring to bear in support of his or her contention that
16. Id. at 43.
17. The fallacy is that of equivocation. See A. ARNAULD, THE ART OF THINKING
51 (J. Dickoff & P. James trans. 1964) (1st ed. 1662) ("A word is equivocal when men have
linked the same sound to different ideas.").
18. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 43.
19. [d. at 43-44. For a recent argument for the centrality of deductive reasoning in
law, see N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 19-72 (1978).
20. See Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward An Ade
quate Theory, 57 V. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985); Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 151 (I 981).
21. V.CC § 2-201(2) (1978).
22. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 45.
23. /d.
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there was or was not an enforceable contract between them. The focus
of the analysis is on the question of whether Farmer can be considered
a merchant within the meaning of Section 2-104(3) of the U.C.c.
Although deductive reasoning will not answer this question, an answer
to it is of paramount importance to any syllogism in which the mean
ing of the term "merchant" is to playa role. The judgment of a court
as to the meaning of "merchant," in this context, is what Burton refers
to as an instance of the "the problem of importance."24 In short! the
decision whether or not to denominate Farmer as a "merchant," is one
that is required "in order to decide which facts [about Farmer's activi
ties vis-a-vis Section 2-104(3)] are reasons that justify placing a prob
lem case in a class of cases designated by a legal rule. "25
The merchant's exception to Article Two's Statute of Frauds is
particularly helpful in making the point that the most powerful theo
ries of legal interpretation are purposive;26 that is, they place at the
24. Burton defines the problem of importance generally as "the problem of deciding
which of the many facts in a case will or should lead a court to decide the case one way or
the other because they count as reasons." Id. at 83.
25. Id. at 53.
26. Professor Tony Honore has recently put the matter this way:
If the legal system is to be a continuing, problem-solving system, historical crite
ria are not sufficient. For the rules to be interpreted have in that case to apply to
situations not contemplated by their author or authors. But it is central to the
process of legal interpretation that, though an inquiry into the author's meaning
is often not sufficient, interpretation takes as its starting-point the words of non
verbal practices to be interpreted. Its paradigm is the interpretation of a form of
words or text: for example, the text of a statute, code, treaty, contract, will, regu
lation, or some other document. This has two implications: first, that prima facie
a legal text should be given the meaning, if any, intended by its author or the
official body which adopted it; secondly, that nothing which the words could not
mean counts as an interpretation of the text. Similarly, nothing inconsistent with
a customary practice can count as an interpretation of that practice.
These semantic constraints ensure that within certain limits officials and or
dinary people can discover what laws prescribe, though sometimes only with diffi
culty. In this way the semantic constraints further the ideology of law. But they
leave a large area of choice. When norms set by society or individuals are incor
porated in texts they become to some extent independent of the intentions of
those who originally drafted or adopted them. To formulate a text is inescapably
to run a risk about what it will be taken to mean; though lawyers try hard to
reduce the extent of that risk. This fact leaves room, in the process of interpreta
tion, for arguments which are not concerned with any possible meaning of the
words used, let alone the one intended by its original author. For the choice
between different meanings of, say, the term 'money' (cash, deposits, assets) can
not be settled by recourse to anyone of those meanings.
T. HONORt, MAKING LAW BIND 25-26 (1987) (footnote omitted).
In the realm of literary theory, E.D. Hirsch remains the strongest voice for the
supremacy of authorial intent in the interpretation of literary works. His thesis is set forth
in E.D. HIRSCH, THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION (\976) and E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN
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center of any interpretive methodology the intended role or function of
legal standards. 27 History is a necessary element in any purposive the
ory simply because it is in history that the purposes and aspirations for
law are expressed. 28 Resort must be made to those purposes and aspi
rations before the meaning of a legal norm can, in any particular con
text, be discerned. 29
INTERPRETATION (1967). Recent developments of the theory by Hirsch include Hirsch,
Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted, II CRITICAL INQUIRY 202 (1984); and Hirsch,
Past Intentions and Present Meanings, 23 EsSAYS IN CRITICISM 79 (1983) ..
For an impressive Wittgensteinian development of Hirsch's views, see C. ALTIERI,
ACT & QUALITY 148-59 (1981) ("Meaning is determined as a set of words which make a
semantically coherent statement which one can see in context as embodying or expressing a
purpose. ").
The role of intent in the interpretation of law is not an "all-or-nothing" affair. One
sees this as soon as one recognizes that intention is not coextensive with meaning. See J.B.
WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 101 (1985) ("The proper question is ... not 'what the writer
intended,' as this question is usually meant-as if its answer were something other than an
interpretation-but 'what this language by this speaker in this context means.' This is to
some degree an objective and determinable question, for what the language means is the
way it modifies our cultural situation."). See also J. HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIS
COURSE OF MODERNITY 196 (F. Lawrence trans. 1987) ("It is one of the peculiarities of
our language that we can separate utterances from their original contexts and transplant
them into different ones ....").
A significant discussion of the intention-statement-audience approach to interpretation
is found in C. CONDREN, THE STATUS AND ApPRAISAL OF CLASSIC TEXTS 286-93 (1985).
27. An excellent example of such an approach, with specific application to the
U.c.c., is McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some
Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978). For a powerful presenta
tion of the same approach in the context of moral discourse, see J. KOVESI, MORAL No
TIONS (1967) (Moral notions do not evaluate the world of description but describe the
world of evaluation.).
28. Ronald Dworkin recognizes this in his analysis of practices, but fails to appreci
ate fully its significance. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 46-53 (1986) (rules of
courtesy).
29. Hans-Georg Gadamer emphasizes this in his discussion of the importance of his
tory as an element of "understanding" the law. He states:
The jurist understands the meaning of the law from the present case and for the
sake of this present case. As against this, the legal historian has no case from
which to start, but he seeks to determine the meaning of the law by considering
constructively the whole range of its application. It is only in all its applications
that the law becomes concrete. Thus the legal historian cannot simply take the
original application of the law as determining its original meaning. As an histo
rian he will, rather, have to take account of the historical change that the law has
undergone. He will have to understand the development from the original appli
cation to the present application of the law.
In my view it would not be enough to say that the task of the historian was
simply to 'reconstruct the original meaning of the legal formula' and that of the
jurist to 'harmonise that meaning with the present living actuality.' This kind of
division would mean that the definition of the jurist is more comprehensive and
includes the task of the legal historian. Someone who is seeking to understand the
correct meaning of the law must first know the original one. Thus he must him
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The importance of purpose for legal interpretation is well illus
trated by Burton in his illumination of the connection between analogy
and the deductive form of argument. 30 Consider the following statute:
It is unlawful for any person ... or corporation ... in any manner

whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or
encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any
foreigner or foreigners, into the United States ... under contract ...
to perform labor or services of any kind in the United States.3\.

In 1887, the Church of the Holy Trinity, a New York corpora

tion, contracted with an "alien," the English Reverend E. Walpole
Warren, to serve as the church's rector and pastor. The church was
prosecuted for violating the statute,32 with the lower court offering the.
following deductive argument in support of its judgment:
This suit is brought to recover the penalty of $1,000 imposed by the
Act of Congress of February 26, 1885, upon every person or corpo
ration offending against its provisions by knowingly encouraging
the migration of any alien into the United States "to perform labor
or service of any kind under contract" ... previously made with
such alien. The defendant, a religious corporation, engaged one
Warren, an alien residing in England, to come here to take charge
of its church as pastor. 33

In the course of vacating the lower court's ruling in favor of the

government, Justice Brewer, writing for the United States Supreme
Court,34 acknowledged the formal correctness of the lower court's
logic. However, in reaching the conclusion that the scope of the stat
ute did not include the activity at issue in the lawsuit, he looked to the
evil that the statute was designed to prevent: the practice of disreputa
ble capitalists of bringing large numbers of immigrant, uneducated laself think in terms of legal history-only that here historical understanding serves
merely as a means to an end. On the other hand, it is not the historian's place to
be dogmatic about the law. As an historian he moves toward historical objectiv
ity in order to see its historical value, whereas the jurist, in addition, applies what
has been learned in this way to the legal present.
H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 290-91 (G. Barden & J. Cumming eds. 1975). An
excellent, short summary of Gadamer's approach to interpretation is A. MEGILL,
PROPHETS OF EXTREMITY: NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT, DERRIDA 20-25 (1985)
(linking Gadamer's hermeneutics to the German Romantic historicist tradition and
Heidegger's aesthetics).
30. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 73-76, 79-80.
31. 3 Stat. 332, ch. 164 (1885).
32. United States v. Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303 (1888).
33. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 73 (quoting Church a/the Holy Trinity, 36 F. at 303
04).
34. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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borers to the United States to work for very low wages in offensive
work environments. 35
The case of cheap immigrant labor was, in Brewer's analysis, the
"paradigm case" of the type of pernicious practice that Congress in
tended to halt when it passed the statute. While Pastor Warren was
undeniably an alien who had been brought to the United States to
perform services for a domestic corporation, to punish that activity
would not serve the purpose of the statute. Because the church's con
duct was not of the sort that the statute was designed to prevent, the
Court deemed it improper for the case to be brought within the stat
ute's purview, notwithstanding the surface applicability of the act.
Burton's purpose in discussing the Church of the Holy Trinity
case is to demonstrate that deductive and analogical reasoning are
each necessary. to an adequate account of legal reasoning and, more
over, that neither can be used in any sort of mechanical way to solve
legal problems. The case illustrates quite clearly that despite its pow
erful role in legal method, even deductive reasoning can lead to unjust
results, unless it is used in a careful and reflective manner. Having
presented the basic elements of law and legal reasoning in Part I of
Introduction, Burton then integrates those elements into a theory of
legal interpretation. It is to that theory that we now turn.

II.

LEGAL METHOD AND THE INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY

The second and third parts of Introduction are the most ambi
tious portions of Burton's book, and the ones that most directly will
engage those with an interest in the role of interpretation in legal the
ory. Here, Burton presents a theory of legal interpretation that is at
the heart of his solution to the problem of importance. 36 The theory
35. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 74 (citing Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at
463 (quoting United States v. Craig, 28 F. 795, 798 (1886»).
36. As noted above, Burton describes his theory of interpretation as "conventional
ist." See supra note 3. Conventionalism has been the object of philosophical discussion
since antiquity. Aristotle, for example, had this to say:
Of political justice part is natural, part legal-natural, that which everywhere has
the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that
which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent
.... Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by
nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here
and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, how
ever, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather, with the
gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even
by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by
nature. It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being other
wise, is by nature; and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that
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both are equally changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will
apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should
come to be ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention and
expediency are like the measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere
equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things
which are not just by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the
same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is
everywhere by nature the best.
Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for
the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, *Book V, Ch. VII.
In modern philosophy of science, conventionalism originates with the French mathe
matician Henri Poincaire. See H. POINCAIRE, SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS (W. Greenstreet
trans. 1905); Poincaire, On the Nature ofMathematical Reasoning, in P. BENACERRAF AND
H. PUTNAM, PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS: SELECTED READINGS (1964). The most
complete recent study of conventionalism in the philosophical literature is D. LEWIS, CON
VENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969) (Regularity in behavior becomes a convention
when it benefits the members of a group.). For an analysis of the historical role of conven
tion in literary theory, see L. MANLEY, CONVENTION: 1500-1750 (1980).
The linguistic conventionalism of the later Wittgenstein is a likely source of philosoph
ical inspiration for Burton's position; however, intuition is of central importance in Bur
ton's development of conventionalism. See, e.g., S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 132.
Intuition is wholly inconsistent with Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical issues, par
ticuIa:rly those in the philosophy of mathematics. See P. HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLU
SION: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN 121 (rev. ed. 1986)
("[Wittgenstein] viewed intuitionism as an aberration, a perversion in mathematics that
stands in need of philosophical therapy, not as a source of inspiration in philosophy of
mathematics, let alone as involving an insight that can be generalized to the whole domain
of philosophical logic and philosophy of language."). See also G. HALLETT, A COMPAN
ION TO WITTGENSTEIN'S "PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS" §§ 213-14, at 291-93 (1977);
S. SHANKER, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE TURNING POINT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHE
MATICS (1987).
A strong philosophical source of inspiration for Burton is the work of the logician and
linguistic philosopher, W.V.O. Quine. See W.V.O. QUINE & J. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF
BELIEI' (1970). See also W.V.O. QUINE, WORD & OBJECT (1960); Quine, Two Dogmas of
Empiricism, in W.V.O. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20-46 (2d ed. 1961).
Clearly, the metaphor of "web of beliefs" is crucial to Burton's development of the notion
of an "interpretive community." S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 132-36. However, there are
at least two reasons why Quine is not a good source for philosophical conventionalism.
First, the metaphor of "web of beliefs" is a psychological description of how we think.
It says nothing about the epistemology of justification. See L. BONJOUR, THE STRUCTURE
OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 195 (1985) ("Quine's main view seems to be that the web
picture simply describes our psychology, how we behave,.and think."). See also R.RoRTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 221-43 (1979). "[Quine's] genial 'Don't let's
throw out epistemology-let's let it be psychology' line is entirely reasonable if our aim is
to show what in empiricism can be saved once we throw out the dogmas. But if we want to
know why anybody thought it worthwhile, much less exciting or morally obligatory, to be
an empiricist, we have to step back from the whole subject and press questions which Quine
can safely neglect." !d. at 223.
A second, and more compelling reason for avoiding Quinean notions is Quine's ex
treme skepticism concerning translation. In Quine's view, no interpretation-even of the
simplest of activities-can ever be preferred demonstrably over another. See R. TRIGG,
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL SCIENCE 10 (1985) ("Quine insists that there will always be a
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relies heavily on the notion of an "interpretive community"37 which,
as is well known, is an idea that figures mightily in Owen Fiss' recent
arguments against the rising tide of nihilism from within the legal
certain indeterminacy of translation, even given the same sensory input. Interpretations of
the most basic experience may differ, and indeed the very notion of a basic experience is
exposed to an empiricist prejudice."). See generally G. ROMANOS, QUINE AND ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY (1983).
This leaves as Burton's last philosophical source for his view of conventionalism, the
pragmatism of William James. See W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM (Perry ed. 1955). But James'
empiricist conception of truth is incompatible with Burton's claim for the role of intuition
in adjudication. See J. SMITH, PURPOSE AND THOUGHT: THE MEANING OF PRAGMATISM
62 (1978) ("It has frequently been pointed out that James was unique among the
pragmatists in assigning to the sensible element in knowledge a cognitive force of its own.
This is true and it constitutes his point of closest contact with classical empiricism and its
reliance on sense as an ultimate criterion."). See also C. MORRIS, THE PRAGMATIC MOVE
MENT IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (1970). An interesting comparison of the pragmatic
perspectives of James and Quine is found in R. NEWELL, OBJECTIVITY, EMPIRICISM, AND
TRUTH 39-61 (1986).
As he unpacks it, Burton's theory is closest philosophically to the "later" writings of
Wittgenstein, for the conventionalism of which Burton speaks are the "activities" of law
yers (e.g., disputation, dialogue, justification, etc.). These activities comprise the "practice"
of law. Claims of justification are advanced within a framework of pre-existing forms of
rationality (this is where Burton sees intuition at work).
As stated above, this perspective (absent the claims for intuition) is completely consis
tent with Wittgenstein's general approach to language. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (E. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1953); L. WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR ~ 55, at 97 (A. Kenny trans., R. Rhees ed. 1974) ("A reason
can only be given within a game."); L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY ~ 82, at 12e (D.
Paul & E. Anscombe trans., E. Anscombe & G. von Wright eds. 1969) ("What counts as an
adequate test of a statement belongs to logic. It belongs to the description of the language
game."). For an excellent assessment of Wittgenstein's views on the relationship between
grammar, necessity, and justification, see J. RICHARDSON, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTIFICA
TION: AN INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1976).
For a more recent discussion of conventionalism by Burton, see Burton, Reaffirming
Legal Reasoning: The Challenge from the Left, 36 J. LEGAL EDUe. 358, 363-69 (1986).
See also Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985). Dworkin takes up the topic
of conventionalism in R. DWORKIN, supra note 28. His analysis of the shortcomings of the
theory is wide-ranging, but his characterization of the theory does not accord closely with
any of the descriptions of it given here. Of particular interest in the present context is his
discussion of a conventionalist approach to Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188
(1889). I discuss Burton's analysis of Riggs from Burton's conventionalist perspective infra
at notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
37. The notion of an "interpretive community" was first introduced by David Bleich.
See D. BLEICH, SUBJECTIVE CRITICISM (1978). See also S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN
THIS CLASS? 355 (1980) ("[I]nterpretation is the only game in town."). See generally E.
SCHAUBER & E. SPOLSKY, THE BOUNDS OF INTERPRETATION: LINGUISTIC THEORY AND
LITERARY TEXT 145 (1986). For a recent effort to enhance the notion of interpretive com
munity with an "institutional" approach to legal discourse, see Joseph & Walker, A Theory
of Constitutional Change, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 172-81 (1987) ("[T]he herme
neutics of constitutional change must comprehend a notion of 'institution;' lacking in legal
positivism . . . . This institutional framework is integral to our notion of interpretive
community.").
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academy.38 Other concepts that figure prominently in Burton's theory
are W.V.O. Quine's metaphor of "web of beliefs,"39 intuition,40 and
convention.
Any theory of interpretation must, Burton argues, begin with
some notion of how it is that two or more cases can be said to be
"alike," and therefore, "members of the same legal c1ass."41 Borrow
ing from Wittgenstein, Burton urges his reader to think of similarities
among cases as akin to the likenesses between members of a family.42
As with family members, no two cases will share all features in com
mon, and yet, each is said to be "alike" in some important way. How
is it that this "likeness" is perceived and articulated?
The ability of lawyers to recognize the importance of empirical
similarities among cases is largely a matter of "intuition," which Bur
ton explains thus:
[T]he fact of widespread agreement among members of the legal
community on what the law permits or requires in a wide range of
cases ... reflects professional intuitions that are developed by legal
training and experience and influenced in each case by the conven
tions of the profession. . .. Conventional practices and dispositions
characterize the legal community adequately to treat it as an inter
pretive community, which in significant respects is different from
the people at large or other professional communities. The legal
community in relation to a legal system is an interpretive commu
nity whose job is to interpret the law, in addition to other
functions. 43
38. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). A repre
sentative example of the nihilism described by Fiss is Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 373 (1982). For criticism of the philosophical assumptions inherent in Levinson's
position, see Patterson, Interpretation in Law-Toward a Reconstruction o/the Current De
bate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1984).
39. W.V.O. QUINE & J. ULLlAN, supra note 36.
40. It is indeed quite possible that there is much less to be made of intuition in Bur
ton's theory than I suggest (see the discussion of Burton's conception of conventionalism,
supra note 36). Perhaps Burton means nothing more by intuition than what, in a different
way, used to be referred to as "judicial hunch." An approach to intuition along this line is
articulated in Bell, The Acceptability 0/ Legal Arguments, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS
FOR TONY HONORE 45 (N. MacCormick & P. Birks eds. 1986) (legal reasoning takes place
within a framework of. accepted canons of legal argument). See also G~ POSTEMA, BEN
THAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 79 (1986) ("Argument from analogy to famil
iar past cases or incidents or general features of shared social life is more likely to succeed
... than creating a new rule which itself needs interpretation, before it can efficiently guide
action. ").
41. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 85.
42. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (E. Anscombe trans. 3d
ed. 1953) (the notion of "family resemblance").
43. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 95-96 (footnotes omitted). The appeal of the argu
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The skeptical reader will no doubt question the empirical accu
racy of Burton's claim that there exists widespread agreement among
the legal community about what the law does and does not require. In
fact, it is the very fact of widespread disagreement that fuels the fires of
relativist rhetoric. 44 While Burton acknowledges this group of detrac
tors, his argument, which is more sophisticated than this brief review
can convey, will no doubt fall short of the demands of those who reject
any theory of interpretation that fails to generate a completely deter
minate account of legal reasoning. Joseph Singer has recently put the
challenge thus:
A legal theory or a legal rule is determinate if it tells us what to do.
A completely determinate theory or rule will leave us no choice; a
relatively determinate theory or rule will constrain our choices,
ment is, at bottom, to tradition and practice as normative constituents of the practice of
interpretation. As one critic of the post-modernist movement in art has remarked in a
similar vein:
For a tradition to be in place, there have to be some shared standards of excel
lence, some rules that are already established. These standards and rules cannot
be determined by the individual-their authority derives from the fact of being
socially determined by the practice. Only then can we criticize and try to change
them. The central attitude of pluralism-that art is various, that whatever artists
define as art is acceptable as an 'end' to be pursued-breaks down the unity of a
narrative history that until now has made art intelligible and sustained its prac
tice. Once there is no longer any ultimate agreement as to the rules which consti
tute and sustain a practice--once there is no longer anything to impose
constraints-all that pluralism can do is obscure the depths of our conflicts.
S. GABLIK, HAS MODERNISM FAILED? 76 (1984).
44. The usual reference is, of course, to Critical Legal Studies. But no general refer
ence is appropriate, for there are certainly divisions of opinion within the Conference on the
degree to which law can truly be said to be "indeterminate" and legal reasoning nonautono
mous. Representative examples of each can be found in Critical Legal Studies Symposium,
36 STAN. L. REV. I (1984) and in the essays collected in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys
ed. 1982).
Roberto Unger, the Doyen of CLS, is himself not above criticizing the more extreme
elements in "radical" legal thought. He writes:
[T]he history of modem legal thought can be written in large part as the history
of the discovery of the legal indeterminacy of such vague institutional projects as
a market order or a representative democracy. The result is to leave rationalizing
legal analysis without a ready-made foundation. Confronted with the ideas of the
rationalizing legal analyst, the radical critic says once again: It's all politics ....
. . . The claim of those who say that it's all politics is easy to misunderstand.
It can be heard as merely the expression of a skepticism that has gone beyond
modest eclectic response, evincing a more radical disbelief in the prospects for any
style of social and historical explanation ....
Those who take the all-is-politics side in this dispute have often given cause
for this reading of their words. They have almost always failed to grasp the conse
quences of their own position or to identify with clarity different ways to develop
and support it.
R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 148-49 (1987).
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. more or less narrowly, within boundaries. The claim that a legal
doctrine is indeterminate means that the doctrine allows choice
rather than constraining or compelling it.4s

In presenting his theory of interpretation, Burton plays down the
idea of constraint, and thus defers addressing directly those who reject
as incomplete or inadequate any theory of legal interpretation that
does not end with claims of absolute completeness and logical inexora
bility.46 As he sees it, legal argumentation is not a matter of construc
tion of impeccable deductive syllogisms, but is more in the nature of
an ongoing "conversation"47 about order and justice in light of "the
conventions of the legal community, as indicated by the legal experi
ence and the totality of our theories about law."48
But what is the "cash value" of these metaphors and generalities?
We can see this most directly in the situation where a decision in a
case can come out either way, depending upon the construction of an
appropriate legal standard. In short, where two interpretive ap
proaches are each embedded in existing legal conventions and are,
seemingly, equally applicable to a set of facts, how is it that the choice
of one over the other can be defended solely by reference to internal,
legalistic criteria?
The nineteenth century New York case of Riggs v. Palmer,49 first
used by Ronald Dworkin so to demonstrate the importance of princi
ples in legal reasoning, is pressed into service by Burton to illustrate
the explanatory power of the metaphor of law as a "web of beliefs."sl
In Riggs, the defendant Elmer Palmer killed his grandfather to accel
erate his inheritance under the grandfather's will, and the question
posed by the case was whether the murderer should take under the
will or be denied his inheritance. Unreflective application of the New
York wills statute mandated judgment in favor of Elmer. Thus, the
issue considered by the New York Court of Appeals was whether to
apply the statute "strictly" or, on some other basis, to deny Elmer his
inheritance.
45. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 11
(1984).
46. Burton does, however, consider several forms of legal skepticism, including Legal
Realism and Critical Legal Studies, in the course of a general discussion of formal legiti
macy. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 187-215.
47. Id. at 204-05 (citing R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE
377-78, 389-94 (1980».
48. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 204.
49. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
50. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23-45 (1977).
51. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 138-43.
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Burton points out that the majority opinion written by Judge Earl
acknowledged the principle of legislative supremacy, but at the same
time argued persuasively for the denial of Elmer's claim to his inheri
tance. What was at stake in Riggs was the proper construction of the
principle of legislative supremacy. To take a "strict constructionist"
view of legislative authority would, Judge Earl reasoned, exact too
high a cost to existing legal conventions. By drawing upon a multi
tude of instances where strict application of statutes had been disfa
vored, Judge Earl was able to convince his colleagues, and the legal
community generally, that a judgment for Elmer would have been in
consistent with "the collective experience of the legal community."52
It was against this collective experience, or "web of beliefs," that an
approach to statutory interpretation had to be developed. The only
acceptable decision that could have been rendered was one that sought
to "maintain as well as possible the coherence and pragmatic value of
the law in its entirety, given the centrality of order and justice."53
III.

CONCLUSION

The merit of Burton's description of a judge's work in terms of
legal conventions forming a "web of beliefs" is in his demonstration of
the inner rationality of the legal process. 54 The analysis is sophisti
cated in that it employs provocative and perspicuous metaphors that
effectively demonstrate the reflective character of legal judgment.
What Burton appreciates and articulates so well is that judgment in
law is not a determinate (in Kant's sense)55 faculty. Rather, judgment
in law "is ... irreducible to algorithm, in the sense of formulation of
fully explicit criteria of judgment. What is required is not a 'decision
. ,insight,
taste, and
procedure,' but an education III
understanding. "56
Beyond the contribution that this book makes to the literature of
jurisprudence, is its value as a statement of what legal theory in Amer
ican law schools can become. At the present moment, three "move
52.
53.

Id. at 141.
Id. at 142.

54. For an "insider's" account of appellate judging, see F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A
JUDGE (1980).
55. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 18 (W. Pluhar trans. 1987). Compare P.
GUYER, KANT AND THE CLAIMS OF TASTE 39-40 (1979) (assessing Kant's analysis of the
role of judgment in aesthetics) with S. WEBER, INSTITUTION AND INTERPRETATION 138
44 (1987) (applying Kant's analysis of the role of judgment in aesthetics to literature).
56. R. BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 163 (1983). See also M. NUSSBAUM, THE
FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 301 (1986) (For Aristotle, "[g]ood judgment, once again, sup
plies both a superior concreteness and a superior responsiveness or flexibility.").
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ments" dominate the jurisprudential landscape in American law
schools. Two of these, Law and Economics, and Critical Legal Stud
ies, represent attempts to politicize the legal process through the pres
entation of arguments for the primacy of political vision over doctrine.
The third "movement" is not really a movement at all, benefitting as it
does from the fact that the orientation of those within it is descriptive
rather than prescriptive. As Burton describes it, it is centrist, with the
crucial claim being "that a conception of legal reasoning remains intel
ligible and defensible."57
This brings us to the principal merit of Burton's book. In clear
prose, Burton offers to the uninitiated reader a sophisticated presenta
tion of the essential claims of traditional legalism. 58 This is no easy
task, and Burton has carried it off in exemplary fashion. It is clear
that this book is but the first installment in what will become a sus
tained and ever-enlarged development of an alternative vision of the
legal process. Whatever the results of those efforts might be, Burton
has demonstrated that philosophical appraisals of traditional elements
of law and legal reasoning can indeed be viable, if not compelling.

57. Burton, Reaffirming Legal Reasoning: The Challenge from the Left, 36 J. LEGAL
358,358 (1986). One important group oflegal theoreticians working in the natural
law tradition are the Kantians. An impressive collection of essays reflecting their ap
proaches is found in Symposium on Kantian Legal Theory, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421 (1987).
58. See J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 271 (1980) (A legal sys
tem exemplifies the rule of law to the extent, among other things, that the making of judi
cial decisions is guided by rules that are promulgated, clear, stable, and relatively general.).
See also J. LUCAS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 116-17 (1985) (describing the virtues of
the rule of law).
EDUC.

